Hostile Vehicle Mitigation (HVM) Systems & Barriers
Overview
Hostile Vehicle Mitigation (HVM) systems are physical security measures designed to prevent, stop, or mitigate hostile vehicle attacks, including:
- Vehicle-as-a-Weapon (VAW) attacks
- Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs)
HVM systems differ fundamentally from conventional access control or traffic management barriers. They are security-first, defence-led installations, where threat mitigation takes precedence over convenience, vehicle protection, or user comfort.
As a result, HVM systems often behave in ways that appear aggressive or counter-intuitive when compared to standard parking or access bollards.
Typical Deployment Environments
HVM systems are commonly deployed in locations where the consequences of hostile vehicle access are high, including:
- Transport hubs and stations
- Government and local authority buildings
- Ports and maritime infrastructure
- Stadia and major event venues
- Critical National Infrastructure (CNI)
- High-footfall urban public realm locations
Threat Models Addressed
HVM systems are designed to counter:
VAW (Vehicle-as-a-Weapon) Deliberate vehicle ramming intended to cause casualties.
VBIED (Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device) Use of a vehicle to deliver explosives close to a protected asset.
Tailgating / Forced Entry Closely following an authorised vehicle to breach a secure perimeter.
Common Types of HVM Barriers
Rising Bollards (HVM-Rated)
- Hydraulically or electro-mechanically operated
- Crash-tested to PAS 68 or IWA 14-1
- Designed to immobilise or destroy vehicles
- Fast deployment times prioritised
These are the most common automated HVM barriers used in constrained urban environments.
Road Blockers
- Large steel wedges or plates that rise from the roadway
- Extremely high stopping capability
- Suitable for heavy vehicles and high-energy impacts
Often used in ports, embassies, and high-security perimeters.
Fixed Barriers & Passive Measures
- Reinforced planters, benches, street furniture
- Structural barriers integrated into landscaping
- No moving parts or control systems
Typically used to create hostile-vehicle stand-off distances.
HVM-Rated Gates & Sliding Barriers
- Reinforced foundations and locking points
- Designed for impact resistance, not throughput
- Usually slower and manually supervised
Design Philosophy
HVM systems are intentionally designed around the following principles:
- Defence over convenience
- Fail-secure rather than fail-safe
- Assume hostile intent until proven otherwise
- Aggressive response to ambiguity
- Automated access is secondary to security
This philosophy directly influences how HVM systems behave in live operation.
Automation in HVM Systems
Overview of Automated Operation
Many HVM installations incorporate automated access for authorised vehicles, typically via:
- Intercom systems
- Guard control panels
- Timed or conditional lowering of barriers
However, automation in HVM systems is deliberately restrictive and tightly controlled.
Unlike conventional access barriers, automation is not designed to accommodate hesitation, reversing, or abnormal vehicle manoeuvres.
Vehicle Detection Methods
Most automated HVM systems rely on inductive ground loop detectors.
Ground Loop Operation
- A magnetic field is generated within the loop
- When a vehicle passes over, the inductance changes
- The controller interprets this change as vehicle presence
Ground loops detect metal mass, not:
- Vehicle intent
- Direction of travel
- Speed or driver behaviour
Dual-Loop HVM Logic
A common HVM configuration uses two ground loops, typically positioned:
- One on the secure side of the barrier
- One on the non-secure side
The control logic is designed to:
- Lower the barrier when authorised access is granted
- Detect vehicle entry onto a loop
- Monitor loop occupancy and clearance
- Immediately raise the barrier once a loop is cleared, indicating the vehicle has exited the protected zone
This logic exists specifically to counter tailgating and forced entry.
Aggressive Raise Behaviour (By Design)
In HVM systems:
- The barrier may begin preparing to raise as soon as a vehicle is detected entering a loop
- Once the system believes the vehicle has cleared the detection zone, the barrier will raise without delay
If a vehicle:
- Hesitates
- Reverses
- Rolls forward and backward
- Stops partially over a loop
…the system may interpret this as the vehicle having exited the secure area and will deploy the barrier.
This behaviour is intentional, compliant, and expected in an HVM context.
Why This Differs from Standard Access Control
Standard access or parking bollards typically prioritise:
- Vehicle safety
- User convenience
- Obstruction detection
- Predictable driver behaviour
HVM systems do not.
In an HVM environment:
- Failure to stop a hostile vehicle is a higher risk than damaging an authorised one
- Safety sensors that could delay deployment are often omitted
- Ambiguous vehicle movement is treated as a potential threat
Manual Operation & Best Practice
Manual Mode
Most automated HVM systems provide a manual control mode, in which:
- Ground loop inputs are ignored
- The operator directly controls barrier movement
- Deployment is supervised visually
Recommended Use of Manual Mode
Manual operation should be used when:
- Long vehicles (e.g. lorries) are passing
- Multiple vehicles are travelling in convoy
- Vehicles may need to stop, reverse, or manoeuvre
- Escorts or abnormal movements are expected
Best practice: Any vehicle movement that does not involve a single vehicle passing cleanly and continuously should be managed in manual mode under security supervision.
Safety Considerations
HVM barriers are not primarily safety devices.
Common characteristics include:
- No pressure edges
- No photocells or obstruction detection
- No automatic re-opening on contact
This is consistent with their security role and threat model.
Standards & Guidance
HVM systems are typically designed and assessed against:
- PAS 68 - UK impact testing standard (legacy but still referenced)
- IWA 14-1 - International vehicle impact test standard
- ISO 22343-1 - Vehicle mitigation barriers
- NaCTSO / CTSA guidance - UK counter-terrorism protective security advice
Final design should always be informed by:
- Site-specific threat and risk assessments
- Police or CTSA input
- Operational requirements
Maintenance & Lifecycle Considerations
HVM systems are mechanically intensive and require:
- Regular inspection for impact damage
- Hydraulic servicing (where applicable)
- Control logic verification
- Periodic major servicing, often requiring removal from ground
Repeated low-speed impacts are common and do not necessarily indicate failure, but they do accelerate wear and servicing requirements.
Yes — absolutely worth adding, and in fact it strengthens the page technically and defensively.
HVM barriers are expected to be impacted. Treating impacts as reportable inspection events (not just “damage”) aligns with real-world HVM operation, CT guidance, and liability management.
Below is a drop-in section you can add under Maintenance & Lifecycle Considerations (or as its own subsection). It’s written in the same FireSecure tone.
Post-Collision Inspection & Impact Response (Best Practice)
Why Post-Collision Inspections Matter
HVM systems are designed to be struck by vehicles. Even low-speed or “non-hostile” impacts can transfer significant energy into:
- Structural foundations
- Hydraulic assemblies
- Drive mechanisms and seals
- Anchor points and reinforcement cages
While many impacts may not result in immediate or visible failure, hidden damage can compromise performance during a genuine hostile event.
As such, post-collision inspection should be treated as best practice, in addition to scheduled preventative maintenance.
What Constitutes a “Collision”
A post-collision inspection should be considered following any unplanned vehicle contact, including:
- Vehicles mounting or striking raised bollards
- Vehicles driving over partially raised barriers
- Slow-speed manoeuvring impacts
- Reversing or turning collisions
- Repeated “nudges” or scrapes over time
Impacts do not need to result in visible deformation to warrant inspection.
Recommended Post-Collision Actions
Following a collision or suspected impact:
Record the incident
- Time and date
- Vehicle type and direction of travel
- Barrier state at time of impact (raised / lowering / raising)
Carry out a visual inspection
- Alignment and verticality of bollards
- Signs of cracking, distortion, or abnormal movement
- Oil leaks or hydraulic residue
Functional testing
- Raise and lower cycles
- Synchronisation between multiple bollards
- Abnormal noise, vibration, or speed changes
Control system checks
- Fault logs and alarms
- Confirmation of correct detection behaviour
- Verification of manual override operation
Major vs Minor Impacts
Minor impacts may only require logging and monitoring
Repeated impacts should trigger increased inspection frequency
Significant impacts (including any involving heavy vehicles) should prompt:
- Temporary isolation if necessary
- Engineering inspection
- Consideration of partial or full barrier removal for assessment
Relationship to Routine Servicing
Post-collision inspections do not replace scheduled servicing.
They should be considered event-driven maintenance, complementing:
- Routine inspections
- Manufacturer-recommended service intervals
- Periodic major servicing (out-of-ground inspection)
Ignoring post-impact checks risks:
- Progressive degradation
- Hydraulic contamination
- Misaligned deployment
- Reduced stopping capability during a real hostile event
Operational Benefit
From an operational and legal standpoint, post-collision inspections:
- Demonstrate proactive asset management
- Reduce the likelihood of undetected latent failures
- Provide defensible maintenance records
- Support incident investigations and insurance claims
In an HVM environment, impact is not an exception - it is an expected operating condition. Post-collision inspection is therefore not optional best practice, but a logical extension of maintaining an effective hostile vehicle mitigation capability.
Common Misunderstandings
| Assumption | Reality |
|---|---|
| “It malfunctioned because it raised” | Raising may be correct behaviour |
| “It should wait longer” | Delay increases security risk |
| “It should have safety sensors” | Sensors may compromise mitigation |
| “Automation should handle all vehicles” | Automation is limited by design |
Key Takeaway
HVM systems must be understood, operated, and assessed as defensive security assets, not as convenience access equipment. Automated behaviour that appears abrupt or unsafe is often intentional, standards-aligned, and necessary to achieve effective hostile vehicle mitigation.